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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920463-CA
Priority No. 2

JULIE HARMON,
De fendant/Appe11ant.

STATUTORY PROVISION
Appendix 1 to this brief contains a copy of Utah Code Ann.
section 77-7-18, the only statutory provision specifically discussed
in this reply brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For a reason different from the State's, Ms. Harmon agrees
with the State that this Court need not rest the decision of this
case on the pretext doctrine.

This Court can dispose of the case

with a simple holding that the search was conducted pursuant to
involuntary consent.

Should this Court choose to reach the legality

of the initial traffic stop, the State cannot meet its burden to
justify Detective Russo's conduct under either the pretext doctrine
or the scope analysis championed by Judge Russon in his concurring
and dissenting opinion in State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.
1992) .

ARGUMENT
I.
CONSENT DOES NOT SATISFY THE STATE'S BURDEN
TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF MS. HARMON.
A. All the Facts and Circumstances are in Issue.
The State begins its consent analysis by arguing that
"[o]nly the home search is in issue."1

The argument is apparently

designed to give the State the appearance of consistency in the
State's varied positions concerning whether or not the pretext

1. The State argues,
As a preliminary matter, the scope of this
appeal must be understood. Defendant's
plea-supported conviction is only for possession
of methamphetamine — contraband that was found
upon the search of her home. The charge of
unlawful possession of prescription medications,
arising from the earlier, incident-to-arrest
search of defendant's purse, was dismissed
following the preliminary hearing (R. 7, 365).
Therefore, the question of the propriety of
the search conducted incident to defendant's
arrest has no direct bearing upon the parties'
respective rights regarding defendant's
conviction. Therefore, the question is moot, see
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah
1989), and under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure (mootness), this Court ought not to
review it.
Because the search incident to defendant's
arrest is a moot question, the State's
acknowledgment that pretext doctrine may have a
place in the arrest context (Opening Br. of
Appellant at 11 n.2) is less significant to this
case than it might otherwise be. This is because
any possible misuse of misdemeanor arrest power
here did not directly yield evidence that might
be subject to the exclusionary rule under search
and seizure law. Only the subsequent home search
yielded such evidence.
Brief of Appellee at 11-12.
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doctrine applies in the case of a warrantless arrest.2

To the

extent that the State's argument may be interpreted as contending
that the facts prior to the search of Ms. Harmon's home are not
relevant, the argument is mistaken.

The evidence and argument

presented by both parties in the trial court, and the trial court's
memorandum decision and findings of fact and conclusions of law
properly encompassed all the facts and circumstances involved in the
entire encounter between Ms. Harmon and Detective Russo (R. 30,
65-11, 79-92, 104-109, 196-309, 126-193).

Ms. Harmon properly

entered a Sery plea reserving her right to appellate review of the
trial court's entire disposition of her motion to suppress (R. 95).
This Court should reject the State's efforts to limit the
relevant facts of this case.

See e.g. State v. Lopez# 831 P.2d 1040

(Utah App. 1992)(reviewing "the underlying facts" "in detail,"
including the officer's encounters with Mr. Lopez that occurred
weeks prior to the traffic stop at issue on appeal).

B. The State Does Not Carry Its Burden to Show Voluntary and
Untainted Consent.
1. The consent was not voluntary.
Without citing any authority for the surprising
proposition, the State argues that the burden to prove the
voluntariness of Ms. Harmon's consent was on the State in the trial
court, but that the burden shifts to Ms. Harmon to disprove the

2. Compare brief of Appellee at 11-12 with brief of
Appellee at 23 and n.6, and at 33-40, and with reply brief of
Appellee in State v. Lopez, Case No. 900484-CA, at 5.
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voluntariness of her consent on appeal because the trial court sided
with the State in the trial court.
State is mistaken.

Brief of Appellee at 13. The

It is the State's burden to justify warrantless

searches in the trial court, and the State's burden remains with the
State on appeal.

See e.g. State v. Thurmanf 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18,

23 (Utah 1993).
In addressing the merits of the voluntariness issue, the
State condenses many factors to be assessed into two —
consent was clear and specific.3

whether the

If adopted by this Court, the

State's compression of the analysis would omit critical factors
such as whether the State presents convincing evidence on appeal
that the consent was not only clear and specific, but also

3. The State argues,
In Webb, this Court listed three factors for
determining voluntary search consent:
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely
and intelligently given";
(2) the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion,
express or implied; and
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and
there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.
790 P.2d at 82 (quotations and citations
omitted). The third factor actually describes
the State's trial court burden, and otherwise
repeats the first factor, regarding "clear and
"specific" evidence supporting voluntariness.
The State therefore addresses the first and third
Webb factors together.
Brief of Appellee at 13-14. The State then focuses exclusively on
whether the consent was clear and specific. Id. at 14.

-4 -

unequivocal, knowingly qLven, and freely gn/t.Mi,
In til I |ii I iii| I. hiil
specific

consent,

I. Iii

I h*t

referring

t o h a v e a s e a r c h Wil.hhul
warrantless search.
^ppc?11'pp "

1 IIIIIII |ii esoiil s riocii

the State mistakenly omits the

l a n g u a g e i n t h e foim,

with

i imscnt

In i f f

iiiii I

problematic

t n tin 1 " r i g h t s " " p e r M i r a n d a "

«ii i i iihl

I I

irhisi

I .

nnsenl

I

Compare Appendix 3 o t A p p e l l a n t ' s o p e n i n g
ill

I'll

According t o D e t e c t i v e Pusso,

207-r 1 M|i

.mil on 1 lit? way t o t h e j a i l

brief

he

i n f o r m e d Ms,, HIIIUIMI o t liar Mirandd ijcjl'ils li*'lmt> line plr-u.Hi.1 I i"i
h i s police car,

,i„,

in

b e f o r e t h e c o n s e n t {V

mi In M i r a n d a w.iinii i niq!«; h a v e n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e l i g h t

r e f u s e t o consent t o w a r r a n t l e s s searches,"'1

ML.

t:o

Il I iir IIIIIII IIIIIII

of the form indicating that she waived hei rlcjhl to refuse a
w ar r at,1 less seat •'

•

' "lav. u| h n . informed "per

Miranda" of thtiil i ighi niieieiuie does not provide convincing
evidence of a clear, specific ox
The

S I i l l H iiicilki»

in

intelligent consent,,

Il i mi IIIIIII I II ni HI I

II II ni i

o n s e n t

Wits

IIIIMIM

ivoi'vi 1 ,

nor could it tw the record in this case, which Indicates that prior
to giving the consent, Ms. Harmon twice refused to allow the
warrantless search

II In i IIIm IIIIIIH

II ni iis<issuing t lie duress and coercion factor, the State
c-pp^i, fo show " M y absenco of a claim of authority to search11 by
Detective Russo at»«l "tin absence

ecepl n m

4 # "Prior to any questioning., the person must be w ar i led
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
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v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

part by arguing# "Russo expressed no view toward defendant regarding
whether a search warrant might be obtained when he first encountered
her in her driveway and asked for search consent."
Appellee at 15 (emphasis in original).

While the State's

representation is true, it is incomplete.
threaten to obtain a warrant.

Brief of

Russo did in fact

At the preliminary hearing, Russo

testified that when Ms. Harmon initially refused to let him in her
home, "I told her I'd have to come back with a warrant." (R. 349).
At trial, he again stated, "I told her I would have to come back
with a search warrant to get in if I didn't do it with her
consent."

(R. 245). At trial, he admitted that when he told her

that he would have to come back with a warrant, he knew he could not
obtain a warrant, but did not so inform Ms. Harmon (R. 224-227).
Russo admitted in cross and re-cross examination that he told Ms.
Harmon that he would have to get a warrant and warned her that it
would be unpleasant if he had to resort to a warrant (R. 248-249) .
He testified on direct examination that after Julie Harmon gave
verbal consent to the search on the way to the jail, he told her
that he would instead apply for a warrant (R. 209). The State's
argument that Ms. Harmon's admissions on the way to the jail
provided the probable cause so that Russo could have obtained a
warrant does not address his threat to get a warrant before she made
the admissions.

More importantly, her admissions do not provide

legal probable cause for a warrant because they are a fruit of the
illegal search and seizure of Ms. Harmon.

See e.g. United States v.

Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984)(validity of issuance of search
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Harmon's rights.
The State's arguments that after the arrest, Russo's
conduct was "even less than a mere request" to search, and that Ms.
Harmon was cooperative in "spontaneously proffering her consent"
brief of Appellee at 17, are mere conclusions that are not and
cannot be supported with accurate and complete citations to the
record.

In these circumstances, the State has failed to carry its

burden.
The State's final argument going to duress and coercion,
that the consent form goes beyond current constitutional
requirements in informing Ms. Harmon of her right to refuse to
consent to the warrantless search, brief of Appellee at 17, again
overlooks how the consent form confused the Miranda warnings with an
informed waiver of Ms. Harmon's right to refuse a warrantless search
of her home.

See Appendix 3 to opening brief of Appellant.

Had there been no taint from Detective Russo's illegal
conduct, the State could not meet its burden on appeal to
demonstrate convincing proof of voluntary consent.

Particularly

because of Detective Russo's illegal conduct, discussed infra, the
State fails to meet the higher burden of proof of voluntariness.
See e.g. State v. Robinson and Towers, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App.
1990)("[A] prosecutor attempting to prove voluntary consent after
illegal police action 'has a much heavier burden to satisfy than
when proving consent to search' which does not follow police
misconduct.")(citations omitted).
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2m T h e consent was not obtained by means distinguishable from
Detective Russo / s illegal conduct.
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consideration,

The principle underlying the exploitation test is
that the Fourth Amendment should not permit law
enforcement "to ratify their own illegal conduct
by merely obtaining a consent after the
illegality has occurred." Arroyo, 796 P.2a
689. Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the
police from engaging in illegal conduct even
though that conduct may be followed by a
voluntary consent to the subsequent search.
The deterrence rationale discussed in Arroyo
is grounded in the United States Supreme Court'^
decision in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975). There, Justice Powell, in a concurring
opinion joined by now Chief Justice Rehnquist,
made it clear that the analysis used to
invalidate consent on the basis of exploitation
was grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes of
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 608-12. Justice
Powell's admonition that the exploitation
analysis "always should be conducted with the
deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule sharply in focus," .id. at 612,
has become a cornerstone of search and seizure
j urisprudence.
taj1

^ v . Rep. at 21 (citations omitted).

The State correctly states the relevant factors to be
considered in the analysis: "'the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct,' the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and
the consent, and 'the presence of intervening circumstances,'"
Thurman at 21, quoted in brief of Appellee at 18,

Because the State

apparently fails to appreciate the importance of the deterrence
rationale in Thurman, the State's application of the factors is
incorrect.
In discussing the "purpose and flagrancy" factors, the
Thurman court emphasized the operant policy considerations, stating,
The "purpose and flagrancy" factor directly
relates to the deterrent value of suppression.
As Justice Powell noted in Brown, "The deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily
assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right." Thus, if
the police had no "purpose in engaging in the
misconduct — for example if the illegality arose
because we later invalidated a statute on which
the police had relied in good faith —
suppression would have no deterrent value. At
the other extreme, if the purpose of the
misconduct was to achieve the consent,
suppression of the resulting evidence clearly
will have a deterrent effect and further analysis
rarely will be required. Similarly, if the
misconduct is flagrantly abusive, there is a
greater likelihood that the police engaged in the
conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives,
and suppressing the resulting evidence will have
a greater likelihood of deterring similar
misconduct in the future.
Thurman at 21-22 (citations omitted).
In its analysis of the purpose and flagrancy factors, the
State argues that Detective Russo initially had a purpose to
investigate Ms. Harmon's drug possession, an "interest" that was
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sustained throughout the entire scenario, but that he really acted
on a valid "new purpose" to enforce the traffic code.

Brief of

Appellee at 18. The problem with the argument is that Russo never
did enforce the traffic code; Ms. Harmon was never cited for or
charged with driving on suspension.

A correct application of

Thurman demonstrates that when Detective Russo arrested Ms. Harmon
"for driving on suspension," his purpose was to achieve her consent
to the warrantless search of her home.

The arrest was a "pretext

for collateral objectives," Thurman, supra, heightening the
deterrent value of suppression in this case.

See id.

Contrary to the State's arguments at page 19 of Appellee's
brief, Ms. Harmon has not distorted Detective Russo's allegations
that Ms. Harmon was a rumored drug lord with all of the drugs in
Columbia in her house (R. 348, 228), and Ms. Harmon has never
contended that Russo was acting illegally in making these comments.
Ms. Harmon has included these facts in her brief because they are
relevant to demonstrate Detective Russo's intention from the outset
of the encounter with Ms. Harmon.
In arguing that the arrest was not flagrant misconduct, the
State goes so far as to imply that at the time of the arrest, all
police officers had a legal duty to arrest all violators of the
traffic code,5 and that Detective Russo should have arrested Ms.

5. The State argues,
Because section 41-1-17 stated that officers
shall make arrests for Motor Vehicle Act
violations, Russo's discretion was legislatively
directed against merely citing defendant for
(footnote continues)

-11-

Harmon for driving on suspension.

Brief of Appellee at 20 and n.5.

The State's argument fails to note the fact that Utah Code Ann.
section 77-7-18, in effect at the time of the arrest, provided that
Ms. Harmon's violation of the traffic code could be resolved by a
citation.

That section states,

A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person
into custody, any public official of any county
or municipality charged with the enforcement of
the law, and personnel employed at an inspection
and checking station or port of entry under
Section 27-12-19 may issue and deliver a citation
requiring any person subject to arrest or
prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction charge
to appear at the court of the magistrate before
whom the person should be taken pursuant to law
if the person had been arrested."
Russo had no legal duty to arrest Ms. Harmon.
Russo's conduct was flagrant misconduct.

The evidence in

this case demonstrates that his arrest of Ms. Harmon for driving on
suspension deviated from the normal course of issuing a citation,
and conflicted with the presumptive policy in place at the jail at

(footnote 5 continued)
driving under suspension a class C misdemeanor.
In the rewritten Motor Vehicle Act,
effective in 1992, section 41-1-17 was replaced
by Utah Code Ann. §§41-la-107, 41-3-105(8)(a)
(Supp. 1992). Those provisions lack the
mandatory "shall" arrest language of section
41-1-17, applicable at the time of defendant's
1991 arrest, except for certain offenses not
appearing to include driving under suspension.
It thus appears that the power to make an arrest
for driving under suspension. It thus appears
that the power to make an arrest for driving
under suspension now falls within the permissive
"may" language of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 (1990).
Brief of Appellee at 20 and n.5 (emphasis in original).
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the time of the arrest not to incarcerate those driving on
suspension.

Detective Russo in fact did not enforce the traffic

code in this case, but was simply using the traffic arrest as a
pretext to achieve his collateral objective, obtaining Ms. Harmon's
consent to the warrantless search of her home.
The State argues that Detective Russo's conduct was not
flagrant and that deterrence would not be served by suppressing the
evidence in this case because the Lopez decision was not yet
published at the time of this arrest.

Brief of Appellee at 21. At

the time of the arrest, Detective Russo should have known better
than to arrest Ms. Harmon and threaten her with the unpleasant
prospect of his having to obtain a warrant in order to obtain her
consent to search her home in order to investigate a confidential
informant's tip that Ms. Harmon was involved in illegal drugs. See
e.g. United States v. Lefkowitzf 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932)("An arrest
may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.") ; State v.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)(condemning pretextual use of
traffic stop to investigate driver).
The State's argument concerning the temporal proximity
factor is incomprehensible to counsel for Ms. Harmon.6

The State

6. The entirety of the State's argument is as follows:
Turning to temporal proximity of the arrest
and the consent, this factor is less helpful in
attenuation analysis here. See Sims, 808 P.2d at
151 & n.19 (Time ranging form "brief
conversation" to two hours not significant for
attenuation). The time to travel some seventy to
ninety blocks, in police custody (Opening Br. of
Appellant at 6), does not, by itself, appear
highly significant.
Brief of Appellee at 21-22.
-13-

argues that Ms. Harmon's "spontaneous" offer of consent and the
absence of flagrant police misconduct provide intervening
circumstances sufficient to attenuate the consent from the illegal
arrest.

Brief of appellee at 22-23.
Reference to Thurman is again helpful.

In Thurman, the

court explained the "temporal proximity" and "intervening
circumstances" factors together in light of the deterrence theory
underlying the taint analysis, stating,
Courts should also consider the time that elapsed
between the illegality and the giving of the
consent and the presence or absence of
intervening events that might be relevant to
attenuation. The deterrence principle also
underlies these factors. The deterrent value of
suppressing evidence seized following police
illegality is negligible where the subsequent
consent to search is substantially separated
either temporally or circumstantially from that
illegality. As one commentator has noted,
Where the chain between the challenged
evidence and the primary illegality is
long or the linkage can be shown only by
"sophisticated argument," exclusion
would seem inappropriate. In such a
case it is highly unlikely that the
police officers foresaw the challenged
evidence as a probable product of their
illegality; thus it could not have been
a motivating force behind it. It
follows that the threat of exclusion
could not possibly operate as a
deterrent in that situation.
Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
The court then explained how all of the attenuation factors
are to be weighed, in light of the policy of deterring illegal
police misconduct, stating,
[T]he exploitation analysis requires a balancing
of the relative egregiousness of the misconduct
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against the time and circumstances that intervene
before the consent is given. The nature and
degree of the illegality will usually be
inversely related to the effectiveness of time
and intervening events to dissipate the presumed
taint. Where the misconduct is extreme, we will
require a clean break in the chain of events
between the misconduct and the consent to find
the consent valid. For example, Justice Powell
in Brown suggested that, where it appears from
the facts that the police purposely engaged in
the conduct to induce a confession, an
intervening consultation with counsel or
presentation before a magistrate may be required
before the taint can be removed. The same type
of break should be required where the evidence
shows that the police purposely engaged in
conduct to induce a consent. Conversely, where
it appears that the illegality arose as the
result of negligence, the lapse of time between
the misconduct and the consent and the presence
of intervening events become less critical to the
dissipation of the taint.
Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, because Detective Russo performed the
illegal arrest, not to enforce the traffic code, but in order to
obtain Ms. Harmon's consent, Thurman requires the State to show a
clean break in the chain of events between the illegality and the
consent, equivalent to consultation with counsel or presentation
before a magistrate.

See id.

The State cannot make any such

showing on the facts of this case, wherein Ms. Harmon offered her
consent, not spontaneously, but under the coercion of Detective
Russo's illegal arrest and continuing pressure to allow him to
search her home.
Because the State did not meet its burdens to show
voluntary and untainted consent, this Court should rule that the
evidence seized in the warrantless searches must be suppressed.
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II.
MS. HARMONS ARREST WAS ILLEGAL UNDER EITHER
THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE OR SCOPE ANALYSIS.
In State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992), the
majority opinion maintained the validity of the pretext doctrine,
while Judge Russon wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in
which he explained that the pretext doctrine is unnecessary in most
cases because the law requires the scope of an officer's conduct to
be tailored to its legitimate purpose.

This Court may resolve this

case on the basis of scope analysis and need not address the pretext
doctrine if the Court so chooses.

A. The Scope of Detective Russo's Conduct was Illegal.
Detective Russo's purported purpose was to enforce the
traffic code prescribing driving on suspension.

Rather than citing

Ms. Harmon for driving on suspension, Detective Russo arrested her,
handcuffed her, searched her and her belongings, and informed her
that he knew that she had drugs in her house and that it would be
unpleasant if he had to get a warrant to perform the search.

After

he obtained her consent to the search of her home and found
incriminating evidence during the search of her home, he never
charged her with a traffic offense.

Because his conduct exceeded

its proper scope, suppression is appropriate.
Appellant at 16-19.

See brief of

The State has presented no argument to the

contrary.
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B. Detective Russo's Conduct Violated the Pretext Doctrine,
In the event that this Court does choose to address the
pretext doctrine here, the State's arguments concerning the doctrine
are addressed seriatim.
The State argues that State v. Cruzy 838 P.2d 83 (Utah App.
1992), modifies Lopez pretext analysis, and renders consideration of
Detective Russo's intent to investigate drugs irrelevant to the
pretext analysis.

Brief of Appellee at 24. While the State's

quotations from Cruz are correct, the State's argument that Cruz
modifies Lopez is not.

The Cruz opinion simply quotes Lopez, and

there is nothing in the Cruz opinion modifying Lopez. As noted in
Judge Russon's concurring opinion, the discussion of the pretext
doctrine in Cruz is dicta.

838 P.2d at 85.

The State implies that under Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128 (1978), consideration of Detective Russo's subjective
intent for assessment of his credibility is not necessary in this
case because Ms. Harmon did not dispute that she was driving on
suspension.

Brief of Appellee at 25. The fact that Ms. Harmon was

driving on suspension does not immunize Russo's credibility from
scrutiny.

The impeachment of his inconsistent testimony concerning

the scope of the events that occurred between the arrest and the
search (e.g. R. 223-224) was relevant to the legality of the entire
transaction.

The State's argument omits the portion of the Scott

decision indicating that an officer's subjective intent is relevant
not only in assessing his credibility, but also in determining
whether suppression is the appropriate remedy.
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See Scott, 436 U.S.

at 139 n.13.

See also State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 22

(Utah 1993)(deterrence is most appropriate where police engage in
"conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives.").

As demonstrated

supra, because Detective Russo arrested Ms. Harmon as a pretext for
his collateral objective of obtaining her consent to conduct a
warrantless search, suppression is appropriate in this case.
The State argues that under Lopez , the pretext doctrine
does not apply in this case because driving on suspension is not a
minor offense, but is a major offense that presumptively should
result in custodial arrests.

Brief of appellee at 25-27.

While it

is true that suspension of driving privileges may reflect that the
suspended driver has posed a danger to the public in the past, id.,
that is not always the case.

For instance, here, Ms. Harmon

indicated that her license was suspended because her friend was
stopped while driving one of Ms. Harmon's uninsured vehicles.
driving on suspension is not an accidental offense, id.,

While

many

traffic offenses are not accidental, and yet do not result in
custodial arrests.

Driving on suspension in this case was a mere

malum prohibitum transgression, hardly comparing to the evils posed
by one driving sixty miles an hour in a residential section.
Compare the facts of this case with those in State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d
83, 85 (Utah App. 1992)(pretext doctrine inapplicable where
defendant was stopped while speeding at sixty miles an hour in a
residential section.
The State's argument that Russo's conduct should be
affirmed because driving on suspension is a serious offense misses

the critical fact in this case: Russo never enforced the law
prohibiting driving on suspension.

While the traffic code's

prohibition of driving on suspension is surely a legitimate and
important law, it was not intended to be used as it was here, as a
pretext to avoid the warrant requirement in coercing Ms. Harmon's
consent to the search of her home.

Whatever policy considerations

underly the traffic code's prohibition of driving on suspension are
not at issue in this case# where the detective was merely utilizing
the traffic code pretextually to obtain Ms. Harmon's consent.
The evidence presented to the trial court demonstrates that
citation is the usual course of action taken by a police officer
enforcing the prohibition against driving on suspension, unless the
driver is intoxicated, and that at the time of Ms. Harmon's arrest,
there was a presumptive no-booking policy in place at the jail for
those arrested for driving on suspension (R. 233, 268-269,
272-273).

The State essentially concedes that the State did not

meet its burden to demonstrate that a hypothetical reasonable
officer would have arrested Ms. Harmon for driving on suspension,
although the State omits the portion of the test concerning whether
the hypothetical reasonable officer would have made the arrest in
the absence of Detective Russo's pretextual motivation.

Brief of

appellee at 27-30. Rather than conceding that the proper
application of the governing law requires suppression of the
evidence, the State proposes that this Court should modify pretext
analysis and adopt the State's standard, whereby evidence is
suppressed only in cases wherein an officer's conduct is theretofore
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"unheard of."

Brief of Appellee at 28-29.

The State's argument

overlooks the doctrine of stare decisis# which calls for adherence
to precedents set by this Court.

See e.g. State v. Thurman, 203

Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1993)(the "predictability of the law and
the fairness of adjudication" require Courts to follow the Courts'
own precedents) . Particularly in this case involving a custodial
arrest for a misdemeanor traffic offense, the State's prior argument
is more convincing than its present position.
[T]he State's argument that this Court should
abandon the pretext analysis adopted in Sierra is
directed only at traffic stops and does not
extend to misdemeanor traffic arrests. The State
shares defendant's concern that a misdemeanor
traffic arrest could be misused by a police
officer as a pretext to conduct a highly
intrusive search of the arrested person and his
or her vehicle without reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or a warrant. While an officer
appears to have the authority to arrest for a
misdemeanor traffic violation under Utah law,
that clearly is not the usual practice.
Reply brief of Appellee in State v. Lopez, Case No. 900484-CA, at 5
(footnote omitted).

While it is true that the pretext doctrine is

not always a boon to obtaining and maintaining criminal convictions,
brief of Appellee at 29, it is important to the integrity of the
courts and to insuring that police are not abusing their powers,
discriminating in the enforcement of the laws, and trying to evade
the warrant requirement.

See State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040,

1044-1046 (explaining rationales behind pretext doctrine).
The State complains that Ms. Harmon failed to demonstrate
that police officers usually used a driver's state of intoxication
in deciding whether or not to make a warrantless misdemeanor traffic
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arrest.

Brief of appellee at 30. The State's argument

misunderstands the burden of proof set forth in Lopez, "If the
defendant sufficiently raises the pretext issue, the burden of proof
is then ultimately upon the State to show that a reasonable officer
would have made the stop absent the alleged illegal motivation."
831 P.2d 1040, 1049.

C. This Court Should Not Abandon the Pretext Doctrine.
The State criticizes the pretext doctrine, first arguing
that the doctrine provides superfluous protection.

Brief of

Appellee at 30-33. There are frequently multiple legal approaches
to one legal problem —

in civil cases, parties may choose to

address a problem through tort or contract law; in criminal cases,
prosecutors frequently have many criminal charges from which to
select in charging a case, and defendants frequently have multiple
legal defenses attaching to one factual circumstance.

The fact that

scope analysis and pretext analysis may overlap in some cases is no
reason to deprive the Courts of either doctrine.

Search and seizure

cases are by their nature fact sensitive, requiring versatile legal
approaches•
The State complains that the inquiry into an officer's
subjective intent in the application of the pretext doctrine
conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's requirement of
objective analysis of Fourth Amendment issues.
33-34.

Brief of appellee at

As noted in Appellant's opening brief at 20-23 and

accompanying notes, the objectivity rule is of questionable legal
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authority and is not consistently applied by the United States
Supreme Court.

As trial counsel argued to the trial court (R.

149-150), and as is fully discussed in Appellants opening brief at
19-24, this Court should hold on the basis of the Utah Constitution
that the subjective intent of the officers is one relevant fact for
trial courts to consider in search and seizure cases.

Evaluation of

one's intent is a common legal concept in civil and criminal law,
and there is always circumstantial evidence available to accomplish
the task.

Several Utah cases demonstrate that an officer's

"subjective intent," "motivation," "objective" or "purpose" may be
evaluated objectively in assessing all the relevant facts and
circumstances in a given search and seizure case.

See State v.

Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 27 (Utah 1993)(evaluating officers'
purpose in violating no-knock statute, finding that the intent was
self-protection, rather than to intentionally deprive Mr. Thurman of
his rights); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985)(rejecting
officer's claim of intent to perform inventory search when evidence
suggestive investigative intent).
The State's complaint that an objective pretext test is
difficult to apply, brief of Appellee at 35-37, is not persuasive.7

7. The State would be in a better position to complain
about the confusing nature of the Courts' pretext doctrine, if the
State could maintain some consistency in its own arguments
concerning the applicability of the doctrine. Before this Court in
Lopez, the State argued, fl[T]he State's argument that this Court
should abandon the pretext analysis adopted in Sierra is directed
only at traffic stops and does not extend to misdemeanor traffic
arrests. The State shares defendant's concern that a misdemeanor
(footnote continues)
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The State's formulation of the objective test excludes the relevant
consideration of the officers' subjective intent, and thus, the
State's complaint is directed at its own standard, rather than at
the governing law defined in Lopez. Many people find all law to be
conceptually difficult to work with, but this should not absolve our
courts and attorneys from working hard to see that our

system of

government is functioning within constitutional bounds.
The State argues that the pretext doctrine is inconsistent
with the Utah Constitution's requirement of separation of government
powers, because the police had a duty at the time of Ms. Harmon's
arrest to arrest all traffic violators.

Brief of Appellee at 38.

As previously noted, at the time of Ms. Harmon's arrest, the police
had no duty to arrest all traffic violators because Utah Code Ann.

(footnote 7 continued)
traffic arrest could be misused by a police officer as a pretext to
conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested person and his or
her vehicle without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a
warrant." Reply brief of Appellee in State v. Lopez# Case No.
900484-CA, at 5 (footnote omitted). While admitting to the State's
concession in Lopez before this Court, the State indicates that in
the Utah Supreme Court, the concession will be slightly modified,
"On certiorari, the State will argue that pretext doctrine has no
legitimate place in search and seizure law, at least in the context
of non-arrest temporary detentions." Brief of Appellee at 9. The
State apparently wishes to maintain an appearance of consistency,
arguing that this case does not raise the question of a pretextual
arrest because the evidence seized at the time of Ms. Harmon's
arrest (prescription medication) was not encompassed in Ms. Harmon's
guilty plea to possession of different evidence seized from her home
(methamphetamine). Brief of Appellee at 12. The State then
concedes that a pretextual arrest provides a more compelling case
for the application of the pretext doctrine than does a traffic
stop, brief of Appellee at 23, but later argues that the pretext
doctrine should be abandoned altogether, or be "tightly ...
restricted in application" to "highly unusual arrest[s] for []
obviously minor offense[s]," brief of Appellee at 30-40.
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section 77-7-18 provided the option to resolve traffic violations
with citations.

More importantly, the pretext doctrine does not

require courts and the police to "trump" the legislature by
selecting which traffic laws should be enforced.

The doctrine does

not deprive the police of the opportunity to enforce any traffic
laws; it forbids the police from manipulating the traffic laws to
suit ulterior illegal ends, such as evasion of the warrant
requirement and violation of principles guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. Ms. Harmon has never argued that Detective
Russo should not have enforced the code's proscription of driving on
suspension (which he never did); she has argued that the evidence he
obtained without a warrant by arresting her for the misdemeanor
traffic offense and otherwise coercing her consent should be
suppressed.

See State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Utah App.

1992)("The pretext doctrine does not restrict the state legislature
from enacting traffic regulations, nor does it facially invalidate
any traffic regulation.

Rather, the pretext doctrine restricts

police discretion when used unconstitutionally.").
The State argues that Ms. Harmon had no "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in driving on suspension, and that she had
"no constitutional right to be a 'scofflaw.'"
39.

Brief of Appellee at

She did, however, have reasonable expectations of privacy in

the legitimate scope of the misdemeanor traffic stop, and in her
car, her person and her home, which were infringed by Detective
Russo's pretextual conduct.

Again, Ms. Harmon has never begrudged

Russo's authority to issue a citation for her driving on suspension;

her complaint is that he asserted but never enforced the traffic
code in order to evade the warrant requirement.

The State's

argument concerning reasonable expectations of privacy overlooks the
fact that the pretext doctrine is not based solely on Fourth
Amendment/Article I section 14 premises.

As the Lopez Court

explained, the doctrine also serves legitimate interests in equal
protection of the laws and in maintaining the integrity of the
courts.

See State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1045-1046 (Utah App.

1992).

CONCLUSION
The State has failed to demonstrate that Detective Russo's
conduct can be justified on the basis of Ms. Harmon's consent.

This

Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Ms. Harmon's motion
to suppress.
/!

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March, 1993.

R. MOFI
Attorney for Ms. Harmon
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APPENDIX 1
Statute

TEXT OF STATUTE

Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-18 states:
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person
into custody, any public official of any county
or municipality charged with the enforcement of
the law, and personnel employed at an inspection
and checking station or port of entry under
Section 27-12-19 may issue and deliver a citation
requiring any person subject to arrest or
prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction charge
to appear at the court of the magistrate before
whom the person should be taken pursuant to law
if the person had been arrested."

